We study the problem of a seller dynamically pricing d distinct types of indivisible goods, when faced with the online arrival of unit-demand buyers drawn independently from an unknown distribution. e goods are not in limited supply, but can only be produced at a limited rate and are costly to produce. e seller observes only the bundle of goods purchased at each day, but nothing else about the buyer's valuation function. Our main result is a dynamic pricing algorithm for optimizing welfare (including the seller's cost of production) that runs in time and a number of rounds that are polynomial in d and the approximation parameter. We are able to do this despite the fact that (i) the price-response function is not continuous, and even its fractional relaxation is a non-concave function of the prices, and (ii) the welfare is not observable to the seller.
INTRODUCTION
Consider the problem of an online retailer who sells a large variety of goods. e seller can in principle produce or procure more copies of each good as needed, but only at a limited rate, and at some per-unit production /procurement cost that varies by good. In each round, the seller can dynamically set the price for each type of good. Each buyer has an unknown valuation function de ned (in general) over bundles of goods, and quasi-linear utility for money. Each buyer chooses which item to buy to optimize his utility function given the prices. e seller observes the purchased bundle-i.e. the revealed preferences of the buyer-but not the buyer's valuation of the purchased bundle (or of any other bundle). e buyer's valuation function is drawn independently from a xed but unknown distribution, called the buyer distribution. e seller's objective is to optimize social welfare: the expected buyer valuation of the purchased good minus its production cost.
Social welfare, like pro t, is a natural objective for the seller: in particular, sellers a empting to grow their market (rather than exploit an existing monopoly position) might prefer to optimize social welfare rather than pro t in the short term.
A tempting rst a empt at solving this problem would be to simply set the price for each good to be equal to its cost of production, which would indeed maximize social welfare if there were no other constraints on the bundles of items purchased by buyers. However, this solution is unsatisfactory when additional supply can only be generated at a bounded rate, because the cost of production bears no relationship to the buyers' values for a good. Because of this, se ing prices equal to costs can result, for example, in every buyer demanding the largest possible quantity of the same good, which the seller may not be able to accommodate. In a more realistic se ing, there will be constraints on the rate of production and resupply for each good. Hence, we study the welfare maximization problem in which we impose the additional constraint that the expected bundle purchased (in expectation over the draw of the buyer) lies in a bounded set. Because constraints of this sort bind across buyers, se ing prices equal to costs fails, and the problem requires a nontrivial solution.
Since the buyer distribution is unknown, the seller cannot directly compute the prices that optimize social welfare. Instead, she faces a learning problem: she can try di erent prices over time and observe the responses from random buyers drawn from the distribution, and try to learn the optimal price vector. More formally, the goal is to use a small number of rounds to learn a price vector that nearly optimizes expected social welfare. We want the algorithm's guarantees hold in the worst case over the choice of distributions over buyer valuation functions.
Essentially, we are studying a welfare-optimization version of the well-known dynamic pricing problem, also known as learn-and-earn, with d > 1 goods for sale. (Prior work on dynamic pricing focused on pro t maximization.) At a very high level, the main challenge presented is to learn the price response function-i.e. the function mapping prices to expected bundles purchased-and then optimize it with respect to welfare. Moreover, this is a high dimensional function (for large d), and so one must overcome the curse of dimensionality. Prior work on non-Bayesian dynamic pricing (e.g., [4, 10, 11, 14, 19, 26, 33] ) dealt with this challenge by making strong assumptions on the price response function itself. Typical assumptions include Lipschitzness [10, 11, 33] (which allows for discretization in low-dimensional problems), and particularly for high dimensional problems, linearity [19, 26] or concavity [4, 10, 33] . 1 However, assumptions of this sort are not well supported by a micro-economic foundation. In fact, natural assumptions on the buyer valuations do not necessarily result in price-response function with these properties.
In this paper, we pursue a di erent approach which stands on stronger microeconomic foundations: we make assumptions on the form of the valuation functions directly (and no assumptions on the distribution over valuation functions), and show that we can work with the price response function that results. is is the case despite the fact that our problem is high dimensional, and the price response function that results from our assumptions is not concave. We also face an additional challenge: unlike pro t, welfare is not observable, and we can observe the purchased bundle but not the buyer's valuation for that bundle. Nevertheless, we design algorithms that nd a near-optimal price vector with respect to welfare, in a number of rounds that is polynomial in d and the accuracy parameter. (Whereas, for example, a naive solution based on discretization and Lipschitzness of the price-response function requires a number of rounds that is exponential in d.) Our results also extend to the limited-supply se ing. 1 Prior work that does not make assumptions on the shape of valuations or demand curves is either restricted to selling a single good (d = 1) [4, 27] , or su ers from the curse of dimensionality and comes with performance guarantees relative to the discretized prices rather than all prices [5] . 
Our Contributions
Our main result solves the problem in the se ing of indivisible goods when buyers are unit-demand or, alternatively, when the seller only allows each customer to buy a single item. Surprisingly, no other assumptions are needed! Further, we give a general result for the se ing of divisible goods under certain assumptions on the valuation functions. In fact, we show how this general result can be leveraged to yield the result for unit demands.
Both se ings work as follows. ere are d goods. In each round, prices are set and one buyer arrives and purchases her most preferred bundle from the set of feasible bundles. e seller incurs production/procurement costs for each sale, which are linear in the sold bundle.
We give a computationally e cient and round e cient algorithm for nding a nearly welfaremaximizing price vector subject to a constraint on the expected consumption. Let SW(p) be the expected social welfare that results from se ing prices p. e seller would like to set prices to ensure that the expected per-round purchase of each good j, denoted x j (p), is bounded above by some supply s j . is models a realistic scenario in which the seller's inventory can be replenished, but only at a limited rate. For example, perhaps at most one truckload of goods can be stocked per day. Approximating a restocking period constraint with a constraint on the expected percustomer purchase is reasonable if the restocking period corresponds to a large number of rounds, because then the realized consumption over these rounds concentrates around is expectation. In the following, we will write x (p) = (x 1 (p), . . . ,x d (p)) to denote the bundle induced by prices p.
Divisible goods. Departing from previous work, instead of making assumptions about the functional form of the price-response function, which depends on the buyers' valuations in aggregate, we make assumptions on the individual buyers' valuations themselves. Speci cally, we assume the buyers' valuations are strongly concave and Hölder continuous. ( ese assumptions are satis ed by a large class of well-studied valuation, including CES and Cobb-Douglas as shown in [29] ). e sold bundles are constrained to lie in the bounded set F ⊂ R d + (e.g. F = [0, 1] d means at most one unit of each good can be purchased).
. Assume divisible goods, and buyers with strongly concave and and Hölder-continuous valuations. ere is an algorithm that takes as input parameters d,α,δ > 0 and a supply vector s ∈ R d >0 , such that with probability at least 1 − δ , the algorithm outputs a price vector p ∈ R d + such that x (p) ≤ s and SW(p) ≥ max
e number of rounds and the total computation time are polynomial in d, 1 α and log 1 δ .
Unit-demand buyers and indivisible goods. We use our result for divisible goods to give a polynomial time dynamic pricing algorithm for welfare maximization in the indivisible goods se ing when buyers have unit demand valuations. Here we consider distributions D over price vectors p ∈ R d + , rather than xed price vectors p. To extend our notation, let x (D) = E p∼D [x (p)] and SW(D) = E p∼D [SW(p)]. We prove:
. Assume indivisible goods, and buyers with unit-demand valuations. ere is an algorithm that takes as input parameters d,α,δ > 0 and a supply vector s ∈ R d + , such that with probability at least 1 − δ the algorithm outputs a distribution D over price vectors In the generality that we state our theorem, using a distribution over prices rather than a xed price vector is unavoidable. e reason has to do with how the buyers break ties when they are indi erent between goods. As shown in [25] , without further genericity assumptions, it can be that no xed pricing can induce optimal (or even feasible) allocations if buyers use uncoordinated tie breaking rules. Instead, tie-breaking needs to be coordinated amongst the buyers: the tie-breaking rule needs to be di erent for di erent buyers, and essentially needs to be speci ed by the mechanism. e randomness in our pricing scheme serves as a coordination mechanism amongst buyers (since each buyer faces a di erent realization of prices).
Remark. In both se ings, we prove more general theorems in which we express our results in terms of a stronger benchmark-the welfare of the optimal lo ery over allocations, without restriction to those that can be induced by posted pricing. 2 e above theorems can be reformulated in terms of cumulative regret for a given time horizon T . en the execution of the algorithm in the respective theorem corresponds to an exploration phase of bounded length. e price vector p computed by the algorithm is used in an exploitation phase consisting of all subsequent rounds. eorem 1.1 guarantees that OW completes in poly(d, log 1 δ ) · α −m rounds, for some constant m. Expected regret relative to the best xed price vector can be upper-bounded by 1 for every round of exploration, and α +δ per round of exploitation. Optimizing the choice of α and δ , we obtain regret poly(d, logT ) · T m/(m+1) . eorem 1.2 implies a similar corollary for the unit-demands se ing.
Extension to limited supply. We extend our results to a limited-supply se ing. In our model, there is a xed horizon of T rounds and the seller has a non-replenishable supply of T s j units of each good j. T and s ∈ [0, 1] d are known in advance. Each day, the seller will set prices and a random buyer will purchase their preferred bundle until either the time horizon or the sellers' supply is exhausted, whichever comes rst.
For a pricing policy π , we use SW tot (π ) to denote its expected total welfare. 3 A " xed-vector" pricing policy uses the same price vector p in all rounds. Likewise, " xed-distribution" pricing policy always draws the price vector independently from the same xed distribution D. e expected total welfare of these policies is denoted, resp., SW tot (p) and SW tot (D).
In the se ing of divisible goods, we simply use the algorithm from eorem 1.1 with the same constraint vector s. e price vector p computed by this algorithm achieves high expected total welfare for a given problem instance: we prove that it is nearly optimal compared to the best xed-vector pricing policy. Further, it is nearly optimal compared to any pricing policy. Likewise, in the se ing of unit demands, we use the algorithm from eorem 1.2 with the same constraint vector s. e distribution D computed by this algorithm is nearly optimal compared to the best xed-distribution pricing policy with x (D) ≤ s. 2 A posted price vector (resp., distribution over them) computed by an algorithm can only hope to compete with the best posted price vector (resp., distribution). us, the mathematical statement behind (ii) is that the posted price benchmarks used in the theorems are in fact equivalent to the stronger benchmark. 3 Considering expected welfare per round is not enough, as one pricing policy may halt sooner than another. 
(b) Assume indivisible goods and unit demands. When the algorithm from eorem 1.2 is given as input d,s,α,δ , with probability 1 − δ it outputs distribution D over price vectors such that
Our Techniques
Our general results for divisible goods build on a crucial structural property: even though the expected welfare of the induced bundle x (p) is not concave in the price vector p, it becomes concave if we treat the bundle itself as the decision variable. We illustrate this via a simple 1-dimensional example, adapted from [29] :
ere is a single good (d = 1), and a single buyer with valuation (
so she would purchase x * (p) = 1 4p 2 units of the good. Consequently, the welfare is
Note that welfare is not a concave function of the price. However, if we write the welfare as a function of x = x * (p), the purchased amount of good, this function is concave:
us, we would like to optimize expected welfare as a function of the induced bundle. However, we only control prices and not induced bundles. To address this, our algorithm has two "layers," where the outer layer optimizes over induced bundles, and the inner layer nds a price vector which approximately induces a given bundle. Another challenge is that welfare is not observed, since we do not observe buyer valuations. Instead, we nd a way to approximate the subgradients of welfare, and use noise-tolerant subgradient descent to optimize over the bundles.
We build on and extend the result of [29] for the special case of a single buyer and unlimited supply (which focuses on pro t rather than welfare). e main distinction is single buyer vs. distributions over buyers; in other words, [29] assume that for a given price vector the outcome is deterministic, whereas in our paper it is drawn from a xed but unknown distribution over the possible outcomes. e "inner layer" of our algorithm extends the algorithm in [29] from a single buyer to distributions over buyers.
is extension presents several technical challenges, and answers one of their main open questions. In particular, we analyze a generalization of the convex programming technique used in [29] to accommodate a distribution over (arbitrarily many) buyers. We cannot use the "outer layer" from [29] because it requires direct observations of the objective function to feed into a procedure for zeroth-order optimization, and our seller cannot directly observe the buyers' welfare (unlike pro t, which is observable). Instead, we develop a new technique to obtain the subgradient for the welfare function so as to enable rst-order optimization. Also, we remove a major assumption of homogenous buyer valuations.
As stated, our general result does not apply to unit demand buyers over indivisible goods. In order to cast this problem as a divisible goods problem, we view buyers as having linear valuations over divisible goods, optimizing over the set of bundles that have at most unit 1 norm. e bundle that maximizes a linear function is always at a vertex of the feasible region, and hence is integral. at is, it is the bundle purchased by a unit-demand buyer in the indivisible goods se ing. However, there is a substantial di culty: our general technique relies on buyer valuation functions being strongly concave, a condition not satis ed by linear functions. A standard way to obtain strong convexity in the convex optimization literature is to add a strongly convex regularizer to the objective function. However, we do not get to modify the buyer's objective function in this way. Instead, we perturb the price vectors proposed by our general dynamic pricing algorithm with Gumbel noise. Doing so has the property that the expected bundle purchased by each buyer (where expectation is taken over the price perturbation) is the bundle that maximizes the buyer's linear valuation function, plus an entropy regularization term [34] . us, in expectation over our perturbations, we can view buyers as optimizing valuation functions which are strongly concave over the 1 norm-even though for every xed perturbation, buyers are maximizing some linear function and thus buy a unit bundle of indivisible goods. By perturbing the price vectors used over the run of our algorithm for divisible goods, therefore, we can optimize welfare over these "regularized" buyers. By reducing the noise rate (and hence the implicit regularization parameter), we approach the optimal welfare of the actual, unit-demand buyers. e extension to limited supply ( eorem 1.3(a)) relies on a structural result about bandits with knapsacks [5] , a general framework of which dynamic pricing with limited supply is a special case. We use a non-standard "embedding" of dynamic pricing into this framework, and a concentration inequality for total welfare that requires a somewhat delicate proof.
Related Work
Our se ing is related to several lines of work. First, dynamic pricing, a.k.a. learn-and-earn, focuses on a seller with a large inventory of each good, facing a stream of buyers with unknown valuations.
is is a large line of work, mainly in operations research -see [13] for a review. Most related are non-Bayesian approaches. As mentioned above, the main distinction is that we make assumptions on the buyer valuations rather than on the price response function. Also, the learn-and-earn literature does not consider welfare-optimization, to the best of our knowledge.
Second, our problem can be viewed as an instance of the multi-armed bandits problem [16, 23] , a well-studied abstract framework in which an algorithm repeatedly chooses actions (e.g., price vectors) and receives rewards (e.g., revenue from a sale). e main issue is the tension between acquisition and usage of information, a.k.a. the exploration-exploitation tradeo . Bandit algorithms are directly applicable to dynamic pricing either via discretization [4, 5, 27] or via assumptions on expected revenue. 4 e main distinction is (again) that solutions to bandit problems tend to make assumptions directly on the rewards, in part because they do not model the ner structure behind the rewards (such as valuation functions).
ird, there are several papers on welfare-optimizing posted pricing in combinatorial auctions [6, 12, 18, 21] . ese papers tackle more di cult scenarios with non-divisible goods and non-IID valuations, and accordingly obtain weaker, multiplicative guarantees. Also, the pricing is either static [6, 21] (not changing over time), or changing over time but not adapting to the observed purchases [12, 18] . is research is mainly motivated by connections to mechanism design for combinatorial auctions.
Fourth, there is a large literature on revealed preferences, starting from Samuelson [31] , see [28, 30, 32] for background. Most work in economics has focused on the construction of utility functions that explain or rationalize a given sequence of price/bundle observations, e.g. [1] . A recent literature studies the problem of predicting purchase decisions given past observations at di erent price points [8, 9, 35] . More related to our paper is Amin et al. [3] who study the problem of iteratively se ing prices to maximize the pro t obtained from a single budgeted buyer (who repeatedly makes purchase decisions) with a linear utility function. e most related paper in this line is [29] , as discussed in the previous subsection. Ours is the rst paper in this line of work able to handle indivisible goods. A related, but distinct literature focuses on learning valuation functions from example evaluations of those functions [7] , rather than from example maximizations of those functions (as in the revealed preference literature).
Map of the Paper
Section 3 contains the our general result for divisible goods (a generalization of eorem 1.1). Our application to unit demand valuations over indivisible goods, and the perturbation techniques that go into deriving this result are presented in Section 4. e limited supply se ing and some technical details are deferred to the full version.
MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
ere is a seller selling d di erent types of goods to a sequence of buyers arriving one a er another in rounds. Each buyer's valuation is drawn independently from an unknown distribution ψ over a nite class V of valuation functions over the goods, where |V | = n. 5 6 Both ψ and V are unknown to the seller. roughout, we will use i to index the buyer's types in V, and write i for the valuation function for a buyer of type i, and ψ ( i ) for the probability mass on buyers of type i.
At each round t, the seller posts a price vector p = p t ∈ R d + , and the t-th buyer with valuation ∼ ψ makes a purchase to maximize his utility under these prices. In particular, we consider two di erent se ings: one with divisible goods and the other with indivisible goods.
Divisible goods. Each valuation : R d + → R + is a function from (fractional) bundles of goods to values. Under prices p, the buyer with valuation will purchase the utility-maximizing bundle
where F ⊂ R d + denotes the set of feasible bundles available for purchase.
Indivisible goods. We consider unit-demand buyers, who will either purchase exactly 1 unit of some good or nothing. Each buyer's valuation is de ned by a value vector ∈ R d >0 such that j denotes her value for 1 unit of the j-th good. At round t, a buyer with valuation purchases
where ⊥ denotes the choice of buying nothing (we de ne ⊥ = p ⊥ = 0), and we allow arbitrary tie-breaking rules. e seller has a (known) cost vector c ∈ R d + such that the cost of producing a unit of good j is c j . e seller wishes to set prices so as to optimize the expected social welfare -the expected valuation of the buyer's purchased bundle or item minus its production cost. In particular, if the seller posts a price vector p over the goods, the expected social welfare is
where we write c (x * (p)) to denote the production cost for the purchase x * (p). For any distribution D over prices, the expected welfare is de ned as SW(D) = E p∼D [SW(p)].
Computational model. We will think of the algorithm as having access to a revealed preference oracle ReP(ψ ): given any input price vector p ∈ R d + , it will draw a random valuation from ψ , and return the purchase decision x * (p). Our goal is to design computationally e cient algorithms to compute optimal prices using only polynomially many queries to ReP. Notably, the expected or realized social welfare is not observable to the algorithm, since it cannot observe (x * (p)).
Noisy Subgradient Descent
A key ingredient in our algorithms is the ability to minimize a convex function (or maximize a concave function), given access only to noisy sub-gradients of the function. We accomplish this using the gradient descent algorithm. Below we recap some necessary background.
Let C ⊆ R d be a compact and convex set of diameter at most D (w.r.t. 2 norm). A subgradient of a function f : C → R at point x ∈ C is any vector ∈ C that satis es the inequality f ( ) ≥ f (x ) + , − x for any point ∈ C. e set of all subgradients at x is denoted ∂ f (x ). If f is di erentiable, the only subgradient is the gradient ∇f (x ).
e basic subgradient descent method is an iterative algorithm that starts at some point x 1 ∈ C and iterates the following equations
and
where η is the learning rate and t ∈ ∂ f (x t ) is a subgradient of the function f at point x t , and Π C (x ) = argmin ∈C x − denote the projection operator onto C.
Now, we will assume that t and/or x t are subject to noise. We will use two variants of the algorithm, which operate under two di erent models of noise. In the rst model, the algorithm only has access to unbiased estimates of the subgradient. 2.1 ([36] ). Suppose that f is convex, and for some constant D,G, the estimates of the subgradients satisfy E [ t ] ∈ ∂ f (x t ) and t ≤ G for all steps t, and the diameter of the set satis es C ≤ D. en if we run the subgradient descent method with step size η = D/(G √ T ), then for any T and any initial point
In the second model, the algorithm has access to the noiseless subgradients, but the points x t are adversarially perturbed a er the projection.
Suppose that f is convex, x constants D,E, and G. Suppose that the gradient descent algorithm performs the following update in each iteration
and ξ t ∈ R d is a noise vector. Suppose that t ≤ G and ξ t ≤ E, x t ∈ C for all steps t, and the diameter of the set satis es C ≤ D. en if we run the subgradient descent method with step size η = D/(G √ T ), for any T and any initial point
e proof is similar to the standard analysis of gradient descent (e.g., see eorem 3.1 in [15] ). For the sake of completeness, we provide a self-contained proof of this result in the full version. 
A GENERAL ALGORITHM IN THE DIVISIBLE GOODS SETTING
is section is dedicated to the divisible good se ing: we give a computationally e cient algorithm for nding a price vector that approximately optimizes social welfare subject to the constraint that the expected per-round demand of each good j is no more than s j . Speci cally, let x * ψ (p) denote the expected bundle purchased by a random buyer under the prices p (or the induced bundle by p), that is
Given access to the revealed preference oracle ReP, the algorithm nds an approximately optimal price vector p using polynomially queries to ReP and guarantees that x * ψ (p) ≤ s. Our algorithm consists of two layers, and we present it in three main steps.
(1) First, we analyze a pertinent convex program and derive several structural results. In particular, we show that the expected social welfare can be expressed as a concave function of the induced bundle. (2) Next, we present the inner layer of the algorithm: given any target bundlex, we can iteratively nd price vectors p t such that the induced bundle x * ψ (p t ) converges tox over time.
(3) Finally, we show how to derive subgradients of the expected social welfare function from information available. e outer layer of the algorithm will then use (noisy) subgradient descent to optimize the welfare function over the bundle space.
We make the following assumptions on the feasible set F and each valuation function ∈ V. (1) is monotonically increasing in each coordinate. ( is can be relaxed to Assumption 3.4.) (2) is (λ, β )-Hölder continuous with respect to the 1 norm over F , for some λ ≥ 1 and some absolute constant β ∈ (0, 1]. Namely:
ese assumptions on the valuations are satis ed by a large class of well-studied valuation functions, including Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) and Cobb-Douglas (See [29] for a proof). We crucially rely on a use property of strongly concave functions: any point in the domain that is close to the minimum in objective value is also close to the minimum in Euclidean distance.
A Stochastic Convex Program
Let us say that a bundlex ∈ R d + is inducible if there exists a price vector p ∈ R d + such that x * ψ (p) =x. Note that each inducible bundlex is a convex combination of n bundles (purchased by all the buyers) in F , so it must lie in the set F .
A centerpiece in our analysis is the following welfare maximization convex program that characterizes the relation between the posted prices and inducible bundles. 
x i ∈ F for every i ∈ V
Let VAL(x ) be the optimal value of the convex program SCP(x ). We also say that SCP(x ) is supplysaturating if its optimal solution x • saturates all of the supply constraints de ned by eq. (5), that
To interpret the above as a stochastic welfare maximization program, consider a market in which there are d types of goods and each good j has supplyx j . For each valuation function i ∈ V, we introduce a buyer i with this valuation, who shows up to the market with probability ψ ( i ). We use a vector x i = (x i1 , . . . ,x id ) ∈ F to represent the bundle of goods allocated to a buyer i if he shows up. en the program is precisely computing an allocation over all buyers to maximize the expected welfare subject to the constraint that the expected demand is no more than the supply given byx. 8 A 3.4 (R ). In fact, the assumption that each valuation in the class V is increasing can be relaxed. Our algorithm works as long as the class V and the feasible set F guarantees that SCP(x ) is supply-saturating for anyx ∈ F . For the sake of generality, our analysis will rely on the supply saturation condition instead of the monotonicity of the valuations. is will be useful for applying the algorithm to the indivisible goods se ing.
If the valuations in the class V are increasing functions, the optimal solution of SCP(x ) will saturate all of the supply constraints in eq. (5). Claim 3.5. Suppose that each valuation ∈ V is monotonically increasing in each coordinate. en for anyx ∈ F , the convex program SCP(x ) is supply-saturating.
For each of the supply constraints in eq. (5), we can introduce a dual (price) variable p j and write down the following partial Lagrangian
We can also consider the Lagrange dual function of the convex program x : R d → R:
We will mostly focus on the case wherex ∈ F ∩ R d >0 , which we can show is a su cient condition for inducibility. 9 L 3.6. Letx ∈ F ∩ R d >0 be a bundle, thenx is inducible. 8 Similar construction of such stochastic convex programs also appeared in [20] . 9 
Furthermore, since SCP(x ) is supply-saturating, the optimal solution satis es E i ∼ψ x • i =x. Let p • be the optimal dual solution. It follows that
Note that the expression inside the argmax is linearly separable across i. erefore,
It follows that x • i = x * i (p • ) for each i, and hence the price vector p • induces the bundlex. Next, we show that the prices that induce the bundlex are an optimal solution of the Lagrangian dual, and the bundles purchased by each buyer in response to these prices form the unique primal optimal solution. L 3.7. Letx ∈ F ∩ R d >0 be a bundle, and letp ∈ R d + be a price vector such that x * ψ (p) =x. en
• the price vectorp is an optimal dual solution for SCP(x ), and • the vector x • ∈ F n such that x • i = x * i (p) for each i is the unique optimal primal solution. A very nice consequence of Lemma 3.7 is that whenever the induced bundlex is xed, the realized bundles purchased by buyers of each type are also xed. is allows us to express the expected social welfare as a function only of the induced bundle. In particular, the expected valuation for inducingx in expectation is exactly VAL(x ). is suggests a di erent way to express the welfare: as a function of the induced bundle (as opposed to a function of the price vector de ned in eq. (3)). For eachx ∈ F , we can de ne SW(x ) = VAL(x ) − c,x . (10) We can show that the expected social welfare for inducingx in expectation is exactly SW(x ). More importantly, by rewriting the welfare as a function of the bundle, we obtain a concave objective function. is is crucial for us to obtain an e cient algorithm later. With all of structural results above, we are ready to give our two-layered algorithm for nding the welfare-maximizing prices.
Inner Layer: Converting Target Bundles to Prices
Even though we can express the expected welfare as a concave function of the induced bundle, we still cannot directly optimize the function because the seller only controls the prices of the goods instead of the expected induced bundle itself. To optimize over the bundle space, we give an algorithm that nds a price vector that approximately induces any target expected bundlex. Speci cally, suppose that the seller has some target bundlex in mind, we can learn a price vector p such that the expected induced bundle is close to the target bundle: x − x * ψ (p) ≤ ε. In Lemma 3.7, we show that the prices that exactly induce the target bundlex are the optimal dual solution for the convex program SCP(x ), which is the price vector p that minimizes the Lagrangian dual function x . We will show that if we can nd an approximate minimizer for x , we can then approximately induce the target expected bundlex. In particular, we will apply the noisy gradient descent method ( eorem 2.1) to minimize the function x , and for the sake of convergence of the algorithm, we will restrict the search space for the price vector to be
where ε is the target accuracy parameter. First, we will show that the minimax value of the Lagrangian remains close to VAL(x ) even when we restrict the dual variables/prices to be in P (ε).
. e next result translates the approximation error in minimizing the function x to the error in inducing the target bundlex by making use of the strong concavity of the valuations in V. erefore, in order to (approximately) induce a target bundle in expectation, we just need to compute an (approximate) minimizer for the Lagrangian dual function x . We rst show that we can compute an unbiased estimate of the gradient of x by using the observed bundle purchased by a random buyer. L 3.11. Let p ∈ R d + be any price vector, and x * (p) be bundle purchased by a buyer with valuation function under prices p. en
e result of eorem 3.11 shows that we can obtain unbiased estimates of the gradients of the function x at di erent prices, as long as we can obtain unbiased estimates for the expected demand x * ψ (p). In the next section, we will give another technique to obtain unbiased estimates for the gradients. Given access to unbiased estimate of the gradients of x , we can rely on the noisy subgradient descent method (and its guarantee in eorem 2.1) to minimize the function x . Note that the algorithm will only nd a point that approximately minimizes the function in expectation, but we can get an approximate minimizer with high probability using a standard ampli cation technique -running the subgradient descent method for logarithmically many times, so that one of the output price vectors is guaranteed to be accurate with high probability. More formally: L 3.12. Letx ∈ F ∩ R d >0 be any target bundle. ere exists an algorithm that given any target accuracy ε and con dence parameter δ as input, outputs a list P of log(1/δ ) price vectors such that with probability at least 1 − δ , there exists a price vectorp ∈ P that satis es x * ψ (p) −x ≤ ε. Furthermore, the running time, the length of the list and the number of queries to ReP is bounded by poly(d, 1/ε, log(1/δ )).
Lastly, we have one remaining technical problem to solve: given a set of price vectors P in which at least one price vector can approximately induce the target expected bundlex, we need to identify one such price vector. To accomplish this, we will simply post each price vector p ∈ P repeatedly, to obtain polynomially many observations from the buyers and compute the empirical average bundles over these polynomially many rounds. We select the price vector whose empirical average purchased bundle is closest to the target bundlex. Pu ing all the pieces together, we obtain our full algorithm B T P (formal description in the full version). T 3.13. Letx ∈ F ∩ R d >0 be any target bundle. For any target accuracy parameter ε and con dence parameter δ , the instantiation B T P (x,ε,δ ) outputs a price vectorp that with probability at least 1 − δ satis es x − x * ψ (p) ≤ ε. Furthermore, the number of queries to ReP is bounded by poly (d, 1/ε, log(1/δ )).
Outer Layer: Welfare Maximization
Finally, we combine the subroutine B T P with subgradient descent to nd the welfare maximizing prices. At a high level, we will use subgradient descent to optimize the function SW over the bundle space, and along the way use the algorithm B T P to obtain prices which induce each target bundle that arises along subgradient descent's optimization path. To ensure that the per-round expected demand for each good j is bounded by some supply s j , the algorithm will optimize over bundles in the set
ere are several technical challenges remaining. First, in order to optimize the concave function SW using subgradient descent, we need to compute a subgradient for each bundle the subgradient descent method chooses at intermediate steps. e following result establishes a very nice property that the price vector that induces each target bundlex gives us a simple way to compute a subgradient in ∂SW(x ). In particular, this means we can obtain a subgradient of the function SW using our subroutine B T P . Second, at each iteration t, subgradient descent may require a subgradient at some bundle x t , but because of the error in B T P , we only nd prices to approximately induce the target bundle. To overcome this issue, we will rely on the analysis of subgradient descent under adversarial noise (given in eorem 2.2).
Lastly, instead of optimizing over the entire set S, we will optimize over a slightly smaller set
is allows us to se le two issues: (1) we can guarantee that all of the induced bundles lie in the set S despite the error of B T P and (2) each bundle in S ξ is guaranteed to be inducible since it is strictly positive in every coordinate (as required by eorem 3.13).
Pu ing all the pieces together, we obtain our main algorithm OW (full description presented in the full version). To establish the welfare guarantee ofD, we will compare to an even stronger benchmark-the welfare of the optimal lo ery over allocations. In particular, given any constraint vector s ∈ R d+1 + , a feasible lo ery over allocations is a randomized mapping π : [n] → F that assigns each buyer to a randomized bundle such that E i ∼ψ [π (i)] ≤ s. Let OPT lot be the optimal social welfare achieved by a lo ery over allocations. e following is the formal guarantee of OW (corresponding to eorem 1.1). 3.16. For any accuracy parameter α > 0, con dence parameter δ > 0, and subset S = {x ∈ F | x j ≤ s j for each j ∈ [d]} given by a supply vector s. Given query access to ReP, the instantiation OW (α,δ ,s) outputs a price vector p that with probability at least 1 − δ satis es x * ψ (p ) ≤ s and
Furthermore, both the run-time of the algorithm and the number of queries to ReP is bounded by poly(d, 1/α, 1/σ , 1/λ, log(1/δ )).
Remark. e only part of the algorithm that interacts with the oracle ReP (or the buyers) is B T P of the inner layer. Since the B T P only requires a bounded and unbiased estimate of x * ψ (p) for each price vector p it queries, we can replace ReP by any procedure that can compute such unbiased estimate. is is crucial for solving the unit-demand problem.
UNIT-DEMAND BUYERS WITH INDIVISIBLE GOODS
We now switch to the se ing of indivisible goods and unit-demand buyers. Our goal is to develop a computationally and query e cient algorithm to nd an approximately optimal distribution over prices subject to the constraint that the per-round expected demand of each good j is bounded by s j . In particular, we will use the algorithm OW in Section 3 as a main tool for our solution.
roughout, we impose the following mild boundedness assumption on the values.
Assumption on valuations. ere exists a constant upper bound V max such that for any buyer i ∈ [n] and item j ∈ [d], 0 < i j ≤ V max .
Overview: relax and regularize. A natural starting point for solving our problem with OW is to consider the linear relaxation of unit demand valuations: that is we can view the buyers as having linear valuation functions over divisible goods, and optimizing over a feasible set of bundles that is the non-negative orthant of the 1 ball. is relaxation maintains the property that buyers buy integral quantities of each good. However, this approach runs into a substantial di culty, because linear valuation functions are not strongly concave, and strong concavity was an important ingredient in our analysis of OW . Instead, we will imagine that we have access to a regularized version of the linear relaxation of our original problem: that is, we imagine that each buyer has a regularized valuation function of the form ,x + ηH (x ), where H is the entropy function (of course, in reality, we cannot modify the valuations of the buyers). We show that we can solve the (imagined) regularized version of the problem, and also that we can induce buyers to behave (in expectation) as if their valuation functions were regularized by appropriately perturbing the price vectors we present to them. Our solution then consists of the following three steps:
(1) We show that the algorithm OW can compute an approximately optimal price vector for the regularized version of problem, as long as the algorithm has access to an unbiased estimate of the expected demand of a random regularized buyer. (2) Next, we show that we can obtain such unbiased estimates given access to the revealed preference oracle ReP(ψ ) in the original un-regularized instance. e key ingredient is a novel price perturbation technique. (3) Finally, we show how to construct an approximately optimal price distribution based on the price vector output by OW .
To facilitate the discussion, we will introduce a dummy good (indexed as (d + 1)) to represent the buyer's option of buying nothing. e seller's price and each buyer's value for this item is always 0, and the per-round demand upper bound is simply s d+1 = 1. Moreover, we will write ∆ d+1 to denote the set of all probability distributions over the (d + 1) items (or simply the simplex over the items). For any x ∈ ∆ d+1 , the entropy of x is de ned as H (x ) = j ∈[d+1] x j log 1
x j . e function H is strongly concave with respect to the 1 norm over the simplex.
Solving the regularized problem
Given a probability distribution ψ over value vectors and a parameter η, we imagine a corresponding η-regularized problem with a distributionψ over valuation functions: for each valuation vector i in the support of ψ , create a regularized valuation function˜ i : ∆ d+1 → R >0 with the same
e regularized problem is an instance of the divisible good se ing, with feasible set F = ∆ d+1 . Suppose that we have access to an unbiased estimate for x * ψ (p) for any price vector p: then we can apply OW from Section 3 to compute approximately optimal prices. ere is a small obstacle in the analysis-the regularized valuations de ned above are not monotonically increasing in each coordinate (because of the entropy term). However, recall that we were able to substitute monotonicity for Assumption 3.4-that the convex program SCP(x ) is supply-saturating for eacĥ x in our feasible region F = ∆ d+1 . is is indeed satis ed in our se ing: 
is supply-saturating for anyx ∈ ∆ d+1 .
P
. Let x • be an optimal solution to SCP(x ). e convex combination Eψ x • i ∈ ∆ d+1 , so we must have j ∈[d+1] Eψ x • i j = 1. Note thatx also lies in ∆ d+1 (these are the only inducible average bundles for unit demand buyers), so j ∈[d+1]xj = 1. It follows that all of the constraints Eψ x • i j ≤x j are saturated.
Moreover, the feasible set ∆ d+1 is convex, closed, has a non-empty interior, and each of the regularized valuations is η-strongly concave with respect to the 2 norm, 10 and (( √ d + 1+V max , 1/2)-Hölder continuous (see the full versionfor a proof). us we satisfy all conditions needed to apply OW , so long as we have access to unbiased estimates of x * ψ (p) for any price vector p ∈ R d+1 + .
From price perturbation to value regularization
Solving the regularized problem using OW requires an unbiased estimate for xψ (p) for any price vector p that the algorithm queries, but in our problem instance the valuations are actually drawn from ψ (without the entropy term). To obtain such an estimate, we give a price perturbation technique that allows us to simulate the response for the regularized buyers: given any price vector p, we will perturb each coordinate to obtain a noisy price vector p , with the e ect that the random item purchased by the unit-demand buyer in expectation over the perturbation equals the bundle purchased by her regularized counterpart. 11 10 is follows from the fact that the 1 norm of any vector is bigger than its 2 norm. 11 e technique of simulating regularization through perturbation was also used to establish the equivalence between "Follow the Regularized Leader" and "Follow the Perturbed Leader" [34] . In our se ing, it is important that we can obtain this e ect by perturbing the price vector, rather than the valuation vector, because we do not have control over buyer valuations. , let G j be a random number drawn independently and uniformly at random from [0, 1], then
x j ln ln(1/G j )
e random variable ln ln(G j ) is distributed according to the Gumbel distribution. One immediate technical issue we have is that the Gumbel distribution is unbounded, so the perturbed prices might be negative. We also need to guarantee that the price on the dummy good ⊥ is 0. To overcome this issue, we will translate the perturbed price vector p into a non-negative price vector p with the following procedure: set p d+1 = 0 and p j = (p j − p d+1 ) − min{0, min j ∈[d] (p j − p d+1 )}. We will refer to this procedure as Convert, and show that the choice made by any unit-demand buyer remains the same under the new price vector p . L 4.3. Let p ∈ R d+1 any real-valued vector and let p = Convert(p). en for any vector ∈ R d+1 >0 such that d+1 = 0,
Combining the Gumbel noise addition and the procedure Convert, we can now obtain unbiased estimates for x * ψ (p) using feedback from ReP(ψ ), the revealed preference oracle for the original problem instance. More formally, for any xed price vector p, consider the following distribution D (p) of random prices:
(1) For each j ∈ [d + 1], let G j be a random number drawn independently and uniformly at random from [0, 1], and letp j = p j + ln ln(G j ) for each j ∈ [d + 1]. (2) Output p = Convert(p).
Given this subroutine for generating random prices, we have a procedure S (presented in Algorithm 1) for obtaining an unbiased estimate of x * ψ (p) for any price vector p. We will establish the correctness of S in eorem 4.4. 
Wrap-up: An approximately optimal distribution over prices
Letp be the price vector output by OW when solving the η-regularized problem, and consider the distribution over pricesD = D (p). Similar to the divisible goods se ing, we will again compare to the optimal lo ery over allocations. In particular, the optimal lo ery is given by
Let x and OPT lot be the optimal solution and value for the program de ned above. Since any distribution of prices is just inducing a lo ery over allocations, we know that
where we write x * ψ (D) = E p∼D, ∼ψ x * (p) to denote expected demand over the goods. e following lemma bounds the sub-optimality ofD compared to OPT lot in terms of the regularization parameter η and accuracy guarantee of the price vectorp. erefore, to achieve a target accuracy of α, it su ces to instantiate OW with accuracy parameter ε = α/2 to solve the η-regularized problem with η = α/(2 log(d + 1)). Pu ing all the pieces together, we have our algorithm OW UD (formally presented in the version) that achieves the following main result, which recovers eorem 1.2. T 4.6. For any accuracy parameter α > 0, con dence parameter δ > 0, and subset S = {x ∈ F | x j ≤ s j for each j ∈ [d]} given by a supply vector s. Given query access to ReP, the instantiation OW UD(α,δ ,s) outputs a distributionD over prices such that with probability at least 1 − δ satis es x * ψ (D) ≤ s and SW(D) ≥ OPT lot − α .
Furthermore, both the run-time of the algorithm and the number of queries to ReP is bounded by poly(d, 1/α,V max , log(1/δ )).
